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 A transgender person faces obstacles trying to negotiate a gender-binary 
world. Going through a TSA checkpoint is no different. A substantial number of 
transgender persons have reported that they were detained and examined be-
cause they were transgender.1 Why this situation persists and what policy reforms 
should be implemented to alleviate it are the subjects of this Essay. This Essay is 
devoted mainly to the theme of transgender rights, rather than race, a central 
theme of the symposium in which this Essay appears. Given the relatively small 
pool of transgender individuals for whom data is available, this Essay is unable 
to make meaningful conclusions about whether and, to what extent, race plays a 
role in this analysis. This Essay does, however, conclude by sharing some brief 
reflections about how race, if explored in future scholarship, could figure in the 
treatment of transgender persons at TSA check points. This Essay will make sug-
gestions about the role of disparate impact analysis and racial stereotypes to that 
end. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 I. THE PROBLEM: BINARY TECHNOLOGY FOR A NONBINARY WORLD . 1062 
 II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS ............................................................ 1067 
 III. POLICY PROPOSAL ............................................................................. 1073 
 IV. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS? ........................................................ 1075 
 V. THE ROLE OF RACE ............................................................................ 1078 
 
 
*  Robert W. Woodruff Scholar, Emory University and juris doctor candidate, Yale Law 
School. 
**  Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. The authors thank Steven Homer and Sa-
rah Steadman for comments, and Michael Woods for research assistance. The authors are 
also grateful to Frank Rudy Cooper and the other symposium organizers for their support. 
1  SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 
2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY (2016) 1, 221, https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/d 
ocs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [perma.cc/HDU2-VD2L]. 
21 NEV. L.J. 1061 
1062 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:3 
I. THE PROBLEM: BINARY TECHNOLOGY FOR A NONBINARY WORLD 
 A chief reason why transgender people are frequently detained is owing to 
the TSA’s policy governing full-body scanners.2 “Before a person steps into the 
full-body scanner at an airport,” the TSA officer first must make a visual de-
termination about the person’s gender.3 After making the determination, the 
TSA officer will press the button on his console to indicate whether the person 
is female or male.4 Making the right call is crucial.5 The body scanner is pro-
grammed to look for penises on passengers whom the TSA officer has identi-
fied as male and breasts on passengers whom the officer has identified as fe-
male.6 
 Thus programmed, the body scanner poses unique problems for a 
transgender person whose genitalia does not correspond to the gender that the 
TSA officer has ascribed to that person.7 Suppose the TSA officer selects the 
female button for a transgender person whom the TSA officer regards as fe-
male. Unbeknownst to the TSA officer, however, the transgender person has a 
penis. But since the scanner was never programmed to detect a penis on a per-
son whom the TSA officer has tagged as female, the scanner will misidentify 
the male appendage on the transgender person as a suspicious object meriting 
further investigation.8 Once the scanner alerts the TSA officer about the anoma-
lous object, the TSA officer is obliged to begin a series of physical examina-
tions of the transgender person.9 The TSA officer must initially pat-down the 
transgender person, and, if warranted, the TSA officer may lead the transgender 
person to a private room for a more extensive review.10 In the private room, the 
TSA officer might require the transgender person to remove the latter’s cloth-
ing and expose the person’s genitalia.11 Despite reports that such searches oc-
cur, Jenny Burke, the TSA press secretary, has said that “the agency does not 
 
2  Id. at 223 n.4. 
3  Lucas Waldron & Brenda Medina, When Transgender Travelers Walk into Scanners, Inva-
sive Searches Sometimes Wait on the Other Side, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:00 AM), htt 
ps://www.propublica.org/article/tsa-transgender-travelers-scanners-invasive-searches-often-
wait-on-the-other-side [perma.cc/42LG-TGHL]. 
4  Id.; Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Erway v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 
5:20-CV-141 (E.D.N.C 2020) https://tsaoutofourpants.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/erway-
v.-tsa-complaint-filed.pdf [perma.cc/WB5V-T9DG]. 
5  See Waldron & Medina, supra note 3. 
6  Id.; Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 4. 
7  See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 4; Waldron & Medina, supra 
note 3. 
8  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4; Waldron & Medina, supra note 3. 
9  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 5; Transgender Passengers, TRANSP. 
SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/transgender-passengers [perma.cc/HB8M-4MSR]. 
10  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 5; Waldron & Medina, supra note 3. 
11  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 5; Waldron & Medina, supra note 3. 
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conduct strip searches, but that travelers may be required to ‘adjust clothing’ 
during the pat-downs.”12 
In 2019, ProPublica published a story describing the experiences of several 
transgender people who have undergone such searches.13 One person inter-
viewed by ProPublica was Olivia, a thirty-six-year-old who declined to provide 
her full name for fear of outing herself.14 Olivia entered a body scanner at the 
Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport on September 15, 2017.15 A 
TSA officer informed Olivia that the scanner had detected an anomaly, and a 
pat-down was required.16 Because she appeared female but possessed a penis, 
Olivia was accustomed to pat-downs at TSA checkpoints.17 But this time her 
experience would be different. The TSA officer patted down Olivia and tested 
her hands for explosive residue.18 Instead of ending the search at that point, the 
officer told Olivia that she must go to a private room for further examination.19 
There, a TSA officer again patted her down, “running her hands down Olivia’s 
legs and over her groin.”20 “I told her,” Olivia explained, “If the issue is what 
you are feeling, let me tell you what this is. It is my penis.”21 Three additional 
TSA officers entered the room.22 All of the officers were women, but they 
would not be permitted to examine Olivia.23 For federal law requires TSA to 
have an officer of the same gender search the passenger.24 Because Oliva’s 
anatomy was seen as male by the TSA, she would have to be searched by a 
male officer.25 Olivia refused to be searched by a male officer, and she was de-
nied permission to board her flight.26 She “started crying and pleaded with the 
officers. ‘Can I just show you?’ she recalled asking them.”27 According to 
ProPublica, “TSA officers aren’t supposed to allow passengers to remove un-
dergarments. But Olivia said the officers in the room with her did not object 
when Olivia pulled her ruffled, black and white skirt and underwear down to 
her ankles.”28 TSA then permitted her to continue to her gate.29 Olivia is not 
 
12  Waldron & Medina, supra note 3. 
13  Id.  
14  Id.  
15  Id.  
16  Id.  
17  Id.  
18  Id.  
19  Id.  
20  Id.  
21  Id.  
22  Id.  
23  Id.  
24  Transgender Passengers, supra note 9. 
25  Waldron & Medina, supra note 3. 
26  Id.  
27  Id.  
28  Id.  
29  Id.  
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alone in experiencing difficulties at the airport. From January 2016 to April 
2019, the TSA received 298 complaints relating to the screening of transgender 
people.30 The number amounted to 5 percent of all complaints during that time, 
an especially significant number considering that transgender persons are only 
1 percent of the population.31 Yet this number may not reflect the extent of the 
problem. Among the 174 respondents who replied to ProPublica, just fourteen 
filed a complaint with TSA.32 “Many of those who did not file complaints said 
they didn’t know how, were afraid of outing themselves or didn’t want to relive 
the experience.”33 
 The results of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, the largest survey exam-
ining the experiences of transgender people in the United States, are relevant in 
this context.34 The survey included responses by 27,715 transgender people 
from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and U.S. military bases overseas.35 The survey revealed that “[o]ne in ten 
(10%) of those who were out to their immediate family reported that a family 
member was violent towards them because they were transgender, and 8% were 
kicked out of the house because they were transgender.”36 Further, “[t]he ma-
jority of respondents who were out or perceived as transgender while in school 
(K-12) experienced some form of mistreatment, including being verbally har-
assed (54%), physically attacked (24%), and sexually assaulted (13%) because 
they were transgender.”37 One more statistic deserves mention: “[i]n the year 
prior to completing the survey, 30% of respondents who had a job reported be-
ing fired, denied a promotion, or experiencing some other form of mistreatment 
in the workplace due to their gender identity or expression, such as being ver-
bally harassed or physically or sexually assaulted at work.”38 Of the respond-
ents who had gone through airport security in the past year, 43 percent, protect-
ed by the survey’s anonymity, reported having “at least one problem related to 
their gender identity or expression.”39 
 Alex Marzano-Lesnevich, a professor at Bowdoin College, provides a 
poignant description of their ordeal. Identifying as “genderqueer,” Marzano-
Lesnevich describes themselves in these terms:40 “[m]y hair is clipped to a fade. 
 
30  Id.  
31  Id.  
32  Id.  
33  Id.  
34  JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. 
35  Id.  
36  Id.  
37  Id.  
38  Id.  
39  Id. at 221. 
40  In their article, Marzano-Lesnevich refers to themselves using a gender-neutral plural 
pronoun. The Essay honors this preference. Alex Marzano-Lesnevich, Flying While Trans, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/opinion/tsa-transgender.h 
tml [perma.cc/P855-J5ME]. 
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My shoulders have started to thicken from barbell presses. Even without a 
binder, my chest is flat. I am often called ‘sir,’ particularly in airports . . . . But 
I am more often called ‘ma’am.’ I have a soft jawline and curved hips.”41 Given 
their anatomy, Marzano-Lesnevich was detained at the TSA checkpoint in Bos-
ton Logan International Airport in 2019.42 Here is Marzano-Lesnevich’s ac-
count: “. . . I heard the T.S.A. agent shout, ‘I think we pressed the wrong but-
ton!’ He had shouted so loudly, I assumed he was talking about someone else. 
But then he spoke again, directly to me, avoiding my gaze. ‘Go through again,’ 
he said.”43 
Marzano-Lesnevich continued: “The long line behind me halted as I 
walked back into the scanner and assumed the position: arms up, legs spread. I 
waited, painfully aware that the others [sic] passengers were staring at me. Did 
they know what was happening? Did they know what the agent meant by ‘the 
button?’ ”44 
That Marzano-Lesnevich felt acute embarrassment was nearly inevitable: 
“When the machine had finished its second scan, I stepped out and waited” and 
“I found myself looking more closely at my fellow passengers.”45 
 Such experiences indicate how the procedures adopted by the TSA fail to 
accommodate transgender individuals. Indeed, the screening process poses 
problems not only for transgender passengers but for TSA officers themselves. 
ProPublica reports that a TSA employee, who has worked for the agency for 
over a decade and spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that the gender 
buttons are stressful for both passengers and officers: “ ‘A lot of the traveling 
public already hate us,’ she said. ‘We don’t want to offend people by [scanning 
them] wrong.’ ”46 
Thus, it is in the interest of everyone involved in the TSA screening pro-
cess that the process is reformed. As Marzano-Lesnevich remarked of their own 
experience: I noticed how “the agent[] . . . looked as miserable and uncomfort-
able as I felt.”47 
 Until reforms are implemented, one would imagine that lawsuits will be 
filed against the TSA. Tellingly, however, almost no such suits exist. The ab-
sence may very well be a tacit admission by transgender people that they fear 
being outed or having to endure the torment of recounting in court what they 
had already suffered at the airport. One exception is the suit filed by the six-
teen-year-old Jamii Erway. Jamii was born male but identifies as female.48 In 
2019, Jamii, along with her mother, Kimberly, checked into Raleigh-Durham 
 
41  Id.  
42  Id.  
43  Id.  
44  Id.  
45  Id.  
46  Waldron & Medina, supra note 3. 
47  Marzano-Lesnevich, supra note 40. 
48  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4. 
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International Airport in North Carolina.49 As Jamii approached the TSA body 
scanner, the TSA officer, upon initial visual inspection, had identified her as 
female.50 The officer accordingly pressed the button for a female scan.51 Be-
cause the officer had scanned for a female, the scanner alerted the officer that 
Jamii’s anatomy did not correspond to a typical female.52 The officer told Jamii 
that she would have to “submit to a strip search in a private room whereby [the 
officer] would inspect the child’s genitals.”53 According to the officer, the TSA 
body scanner found something anomalous in Jamii’s anatomy.54 When Jamii 
entered a TSA body scanner, “a ‘false positive’ alert indicated that the scanner 
detected an anomaly on her groin.”55 The “anomaly” on Jamii’s groin was nei-
ther a concealed weapon nor any other item forbidden by TSA guidelines; ra-
ther, it was Jamii’s penis.56 Although, as the lawsuit claims, “TSA procedure 
for resolving such anomalies is to conduct a brief pat-down search,” the TSA 
officer screening Jamii asked her to submit to a strip search.57 The TSA officer 
reportedly told Jamii “that she was not free to leave until she submitted to such 
a search.”58 
 As one can imagine, such intrusion could cause the transgender person, es-
pecially a sixteen-year-old, abundant humiliation and anguish. Jamii claimed 
that she had suffered a psychological injury, “including symptoms of panic, 
anxiety, fear, racing heart, shortness of breath, uncontrollable shaking, and nau-
sea.”59 Owing to her emotional distress, she states that she has been unable to 
fly even though she had flown “several times per year” in the past.60 In addition 
to the civil suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the TSA, 
Jamii also sued TSA’s officer for violating her Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable search and seizure.61 The lawsuit states that, in doing so, the TSA 
officer acted “in violation of TSA policy, the Fourth Amendment, and state law 
rights of [Jamii], and the boundaries of civil and decent society.”62 
 An argument that was omitted from Jamii’s complaint was whether the 
TSA’s policy has the effect of violating her right to define who she wants to 
 
49  Id. at 1. 
50  Id.  
51  Id.  
52  Id. at 3, 4. 
53  Id. at 1 (emphasis omitted). 
54  Id. at 3. 
55  Id. at 1. 
56  Id. at 3. 
57  Id. at 1. 
58  Id. at 1–2. 
59  Id. at 6. 
60  Id.  
61  Id. at 7, 8. 
62  Id. at 2. 
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be—what some might call her right of privacy or personhood.63 The next sec-
tion will examine this alternative claim and why it matters. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
 The narratives told by Jamii, Olivia, and Marzano-Lesnevich involve is-
sues related to the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the TSA may not violate the 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the 
Fourth Amendment, the government must generally show that there was a war-
rant for the search or that there existed individualized suspicion.64 However, the 
Supreme Court has created an exception for administrative searches.65 The 
Court explained that “where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, 
blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—
for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and 
other official buildings.”66 In Part IV, this Essay will examine what the admin-
istrative search entails and how the unique circumstances of transgender people 
relate to it. Presently, what will be discussed is the larger normative principle 
that is at stake in the TSA’s policy toward transgender people. The searches 
conducted by the TSA implicate not only the Fourth Amendment but a right 
that is more directly relevant to a transgender person’s life as a whole: the right 
to be able to define her gender. It is probably not the intent of the TSA to im-
plement policies that are meant to deter transgender people from adopting the 
gender of their choice. However, the effect of the TSA’s procedures can 
amount to the same. Suppose Andie, a person contemplating transitioning into 
her true gender, travels several times on airlines for business and to visit fami-
ly. Andie obtains information like that supplied by Olivia, Jamii, and Marzano-
Lesnevich. Andie reads about how transgender people face the prospect that an 
invasive body search—with all its attendant psychological torment—can occur 
regularly. She reads about how a transgender person is patted down in her most 
intimate parts and then taken to a private room for questioning, further pat-
downs, and then possibly a strip search. For Andie, the prospect of such gov-
ernmental intrusion may be enough to dissuade her from transitioning to a gen-
der that is authentic to her. 
 
63  See infra Part II. 
64  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000); Pe-
tersen v. City of Mesa, 83 P.3d 35, 38 (Ariz. 2004); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 624 (1989). 
65  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47–48 (“Our 
holding also does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like airports 
and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be 
particularly acute.”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (ap-
proving of lower court decisions upholding airport screening searches where there was no 
reason for suspicion). 
66  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323. 
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 Given the vital role of gender in one’s identity, one can argue that the Su-
preme Court should recognize a fundamental right to choose one’s gender 
without fear of government coercion.67 The issue of Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure presented by the TSA’s policies is therefore bound up with the is-
sue of substantive due process.68 In 1928, Justice Brandeis penned a famous 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States. He stated that the right of privacy, as ap-
plied against the government, is “the right to be let alone—the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”69 As Jamii had 
done in her legal complaint, Justice Brandeis was referring to the Fourth 
Amendment.70 What Justice Brandeis meant by the right of privacy is inten-
tionally ambiguous, however, and it has assumed varied expression in the Con-
stitution.71 The word “privacy” does not appear anywhere in Jamii’s legal com-
plaint. Yet it is the right of privacy that is at the heart of her grievance. For a 
transgender person’s chief desire is to be afforded a domain of privacy in which 
the government is forbidden from unduly coercing her to become someone she 
does not want to be. In this sense, the right of privacy that belongs to a 
transgender person does not differ from the same right as applied to a cultural 
conservative who condemns transgender people. Such a conservative, after all, 
also longs to be free of government coercion as he tries to define his identity. 
The conservative will likely want to exercise those constitutional rights which 
can be organized under the broad canopy of the right of privacy mentioned by 
Justice Brandeis. These include the rights to assembly,72 association,73 and 
speech74 (which also encompasses the right to obtain information).75 By exer-
cising these rights, the conservative can develop and refine how he understands 
his identity and how he wishes to present it to others. In exercising each of 
these rights, the conservative is also expressing his desire “to be let alone” by 
the government. A person yearning to change her gender may wish for the 
same. However, unlike a cultural conservative, a transgender person’s desire 
 
67  For further discussion of the degree to which gender is vital, see infra notes 86–97 and 
accompanying text. 
68  Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. 
REV. 977, 1004 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” 
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1896–97 (2004). 
69  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
70  Id.  
71  See the Court’s opinion in Griswold, pointing to various places where the right of privacy 
is found. Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 483, 484–85 (1965). 
72  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
73  Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640, 644 (2000); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 430 (1963). 
74  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
75  Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 
(1982); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 564 (1969). 
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for transformation will often involve surgery or at least significant changes in 
physiognomy.76 The right of privacy—the “right to be let alone”—for a 
transgender person thus logically entails the exercise of an additional right: the 
right to control one’s body. 
 There is a line of Supreme Court cases that have established a right to con-
trol one’s body as a means to determine one’s identity. In Griswold v. Connect-
icut, the Court struck down a law that forbade people from using contracep-
tives.77 Griswold recognized a “zone of privacy” in the Constitution, one that 
was capacious enough to protect the right of married couples to obtain contra-
ceptives.78 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglass remarked: “Would we allow 
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs 
of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of priva-
cy surrounding the marriage relationship.”79 Suggested in these words is an im-
plicit connection between bodily autonomy and the right of self-definition. 
While marriage does not necessarily entail childbirth, the former is by conven-
tion associated with the latter. Contraceptives permit married couples to decide 
how to define their families by limiting when and, if, to produce children, and 
how many. Griswold argued that permitting the police “to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms” was “repulsive to the notions of privacy.”80 
Permitting TSA agents to engage in bodily searches of transgender people is no 
less repulsive to notions of privacy. Indeed, whereas the Griswold Court de-
scribes police entering the bedrooms of couples, the TSA takes the more literal 
approach by invading the bodies of transgender people, sometimes forcing 
them to strip naked to reveal their sex. The Court, moreover, made clear in its 
subsequent holding in Eistenstadt v. Baird that the right of privacy was not lim-
ited to marital couples but applied to the individual.81 “If the right of privacy 
means anything,” the Court asserted in Eisenstadt, “it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child.”82 A person, regardless of marital status, is protected by the 
Constitution from government control of her body so that she may make deci-
sions about whether, when, and how often she wishes to become a parent. Ei-
senstadt held that such a decision “fundamentally affect[ed] a person,” and one 
can say something similar about the desire to fulfill the demands of one’s au-
thentic gender identity.83 
 
76  JAMES ET AL., supra note 1, at 99–103; Jae M. Sevelius, Gender Affirmation: A Frame-
work for Conceptualizing Risk Behavior Among Transgender Women of Color, 68 SEX 
ROLES 675, 684 (2013). 
77  Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 483, 484–85 (1965). 
78  Id. at 486. 
79  Id. at 485–86. 
80  Id.  
81  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
82  Id.  
83  See id.  
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 In 1973, the Supreme Court rendered a philosophically consonant holding 
to Eisenstadt in Roe v. Wade.84 The Roe Court asserted that a woman has a fun-
damental right to an abortion.85 Writing the Court’s opinion, Justice Blackmun 
emphasized the suffering that a woman would endure if the government pre-
vented her from exercising the right to an abortion: “The detriment that the 
State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogeth-
er is apparent.”86 Most notably, a woman, against her will, would be compelled 
to adopt the identity of a mother. Justice Blackmun elaborated: “Maternity, or 
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. 
Psychological harm may be imminent.”87 The right of abortion is therefore 
analogous to the right of a person to determine her gender identity. The preg-
nant woman, if denied the right of abortion may suffer a “distressful life” and 
“[p]sychological harm may be imminent.”88 A person contemplating transition-
ing into a gender other than the one she was born into may also confront such 
harm if she is coerced by the government against transitioning. The policies 
employed by the TSA place transgender people between a rock and a hard 
place. Transgender people can either suffer the ceremony of humiliation that is 
frequently enacted by the TSA, or transgender people can refrain from under-
going measures to transform their given gender. 
 The latter option is more than an inconvenience. There is empirical evi-
dence to suggest that individuals who elect to transform their gender do so be-
cause they experience gender dysphoria.89 This is a medical condition that, ac-
cording to the American Psychiatric Association, “involves a conflict between 
a person’s physical or assigned gender and the gender with which he/she/they 
identify.”90 Transgender people who are unable to adopt the gender with which 
they identify “may often experience significant distress and/or problems func-
tioning associated with this conflict between the way they feel and think of 
themselves . . . and their physical or assigned gender.”91 A study published in 
the American Academy of Pediatrics demonstrates the toll that untreated gender 
dysphoria can have on transgender individuals and, in particular, transgender 
youth.92 The study addresses how “puberty suppression,” a treatment for gender 
dysphoria, affects suicidality in transgender people, and it establishes that 
“[t]here is a significant inverse association between treatment with pubertal 
 
84  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159, 164–66 (1973). 
85  Id. at 153. 
86  Id.  
87  Id.  
88  Id.  
89  Tim C. van de Grift et al., Effects of Medical Interventions on Gender Dysphoria and 
Body Image: A Follow-Up Study, 79 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 815, 815, 817 (2017). 
90  What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/patient 
s-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria [perma.cc/H9UM-AUY3]. 
91  Id.  
92  Jack L. Turban et al., Pubertal Suppression for Transgender Youth and Risk of Suicidal 
Ideation, 145 PEDIATRICS, Mar. 2020 at 1, 2, 8. 
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suppression during adolescence and lifetime suicidal ideation among 
transgender adults whoever wanted this treatment.”93 It is possible that the pro-
found distress that transgender people derive from gender dysphoria can be so 
severe as to develop into suicidal ideation.94 Another study, published in the 
American Journal of Psychiatry, examines the psychological effects of “gen-
der-affirming surgery.”95 This type of surgery refers “to all surgical procedures 
that a patient wishes to undergo in an attempt to become as similar as possible 
to the desired gender” and thus reduce gender dysphoria.96 The American Jour-
nal of Psychiatry study found that, while individuals who suffer from gender 
dysphoria 
were about six times as likely to have had a mood and anxiety disorder health 
care visit, more than three times as likely to have received prescriptions for anti-
depressants and anxiolytics, and more than six times as likely to have been hos-
pitalized after a suicide attempt[,] . . . increased time since last gender-affirming 
surgery was associated with reduced mental health treatment.97 
Transgender people can mitigate the psychological harm inflicted by gen-
der dysphoria by receiving treatments that allow them to adopt the gender with 
which they identify. However, if the TSA persists in unusually invasive search-
es, a person contemplating gender-affirming surgery may be dissuaded from 
choosing it or completing it, thereby rendering the person more susceptible to 
anguish and hopelessness. 
 Justice Blackmun mentioned in Roe that “[p]sychological harm may be 
imminent.”98 The language of psychological harm in Roe highlights the injuries 
that a woman can suffer from being denied a fundamental right to control her 
body. The Court has also explained in terms other than suffering how such a 
right can empower a person to realize who she wishes to be. In Casey v. 
Planned Parenthood, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s right to an abortion.99 A 
plurality opinion justified the decision in the following terms: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central 
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is 
 
93  Id. at 1–2, 6. 
94  Id. at 5; Claire M. Peterson et al., Suicidality, Self-Harm, and Body Dissatisfaction in 
Transgender Adolescents and Emerging Adults with Gender Dysphoria, 47 SUICIDE & LIFE-
THREATENING BEHAV. 475, 475 (2017). 
95  Richard Bränström & John E. Pachankis, Reduction in Mental Health Treatment Utiliza-
tion Among Transgender Individuals After Gender-Affirming Surgeries: A Total Population 
Study, 177 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 727, 727–28 (2020). 
96  Marta R. Bizic et al., Gender Dysphoria: Bioethical Aspects of Medical Treatment, 
BIOMED RES. INT’L, June 2018, 1–2. 
97  Bränström & Pachankis, supra note 95, at 727. 
98  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159, 164–66 (1973). 
99  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
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the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life.100 
Importantly, the plurality in Casey reiterated that “[b]eliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.”101 The plurality’s words in Casey can apply to the 
right of transgender people as well. For, surely, the right to fulfill the demands 
of her true gender also “involv[es] the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autono-
my . . . .”102 If the right to determine whether one wishes to become a mother 
involves the right to “define one’s own concept of existence” and “the mystery 
of human life,” the right to define one’s gender is no different.103 
 One may object that Casey, like Roe, involves the right of reproductive 
freedom, and thus differs from the right of self-definition sought by transgender 
people. The Court, however, has extended the right of self-definition to con-
texts that involve other examples of gender identity. In Lawrence v. Texas, 
Texas made it a crime for gays to engage in “sodomy.”104 While the crime was 
a class C misdemeanor, and hence minor, the Court nonetheless struck it 
down.105 Why it did so is illuminating. Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurali-
ty, quoted the language from Casey regarding “the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.”106 This language, he explained, was broad enough to recognize the right 
of consenting adults to engage in sexual intimacy: “Persons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual per-
sons do.”107 Even if the Texas law was only a class C misdemeanor, Justice 
Kennedy worried that the law sent a message of “stigma” to gays.108 He stated, 
“[t]he stigma this criminal statute imposes . . . is not trivial.”109 As the Casey 
plurality had done for women denied the right to an abortion, Justice Kennedy 
worried about how such stigma undermined the “dignity” of gays. What was 
different in Lawrence was that Justice Kennedy melded the equal protection 
analysis with the substantive due process clause.110 
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct 
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, 
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is 
 
100  Id. at 851. 
101  Id.  
102  Id.  
103  Id.  
104  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a). 
105  Id.  
106  Id. at 573–74 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
107  Id. at 574. 
108  Id. at 575. 
109  Id.  
110  Id.; Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 46–47 (2005). 
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made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substan-
tive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn 
for equal protection reasons.111 
Justice Kennedy’s words are important for transgender people. The TSA’s 
policy regarding transgender people has the effect of denying “equality of 
treatment” to transgender people. Like the law in Lawrence, if the TSA’s policy 
is left unexamined for its substantive validity, the stigma that the policy pro-
duces on transgender people might remain as well. 
III. POLICY PROPOSAL 
It is tempting to suggest that TSA should simply allow transgender passen-
gers to instruct TSA officers to press the male/female button that corresponds 
with their current anatomy. In the case of Jamii Erway, for example, her penis 
was the anatomical anomaly that caused the scanner to issue a false alarm. Be-
cause the scanner is only programmed to associate penises with males, Jamii 
might have been able to avoid a false alarm if she could have told the TSA of-
ficer in advance to press the male button despite her female appearance. How-
ever, her lawsuit clearly explains why the scanner’s inclusion of only two gen-
dered buttons—one for male and the other for female—can be insufficient for 
transgender people like Jamii: 
Could Jamii avoid these troubles by advising the scanner operator of the correct 
button to press? It is, unfortunately, not that simple. For one thing, body scanner 
operators are often unwilling to take instructions from passengers. But, even if 
they were, the male/female button causes other problems. For example, if the 
operator presses “female,” the scanner will ignore a small item located in the 
center of the traveler’s back, in order to accommodate the fact that women often 
have clasps for a bra strap there but men do not. Thus, if one has external geni-
tals and is wearing a bra, there is no button that will accommodate their situa-
tion.112 
The deficiency in the binary button system applies not only to transgender 
women but also to transgender men. Some transgender men elect to undergo 
double mastectomy surgeries to remove the breasts that they were born with, 
but some of the transgender men who have undergone double mastectomies 
might not have undergone phalloplasties or metoidioplasties, two surgical pro-
cedures used to construct penises. Because TSA full-body scanners associate a 
lack of breasts and the lack of a penis with neither the maleness nor femaleness, 
transgender men who possess neither breasts nor penises might trigger a false 
alarm. 
 It seems, therefore, that the most appropriate way to alleviate these prob-
lems would be to allow transgender people to circumvent the male/female but-
ton system entirely. Currently, TSA’s male/female button system requires of-
 
111  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
112  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 4, at 4 n.3. 
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ficers and scanners to make a three-pronged set of difficult assumptions about 
passengers.113 First, a TSA officer must use elements of a passenger’s appear-
ance (e.g. clothing, hair, and physique) to determine the passenger’s biological 
sex.114 Then, after the officer has pressed the button that corresponds to the pas-
senger’s perceived biological sex, the scanner uses the passenger’s perceived 
biological sex to expect only certain kinds of external genitalia.115 For many 
passengers, each element in this series of assumptions turns out to be correct, 
so they can enter and exit a TSA checkpoint smoothly, without false alarms. 
For some transgender passengers, however, one or more of these assumptions 
might prove to be wrong, and, if it is the final assumption—the assumption 
about external genitalia—that is incorrect, this imprecision can lead to embar-
rassing false alarms, pat-downs, and even strip searches.116 
 If the aim of the TSA’s male/female button system is to allow full-body 
scanners to expect and detect certain external genitalia in certain passengers, a 
case can be made that transgender people should be permitted to eliminate as-
sumptions by the TSA officer and to provide information about their anatomies 
directly to the body scanners. Specifically, the Essay proposes the creation of a 
federal-issued government identification card. This card would contain a com-
puter chip that would allow a transgender passenger to indicate to the body 
scanner what genitalia the scanner should expect to detect. Because individuals 
with the identification card might not want TSA officers to know explicitly 
what genitalia they do or do not possess, the identification card will not, as does 
a state-issued driver’s license, list the relevant genitalia that the TSA officer 
should expect to find. Instead, the card will display either a bar code or another 
encrypted code. When a TSA officer scans this encrypted code, it will program 
the body scanner to expect the genitalia that the owner of the identification card 
possesses. 
 Individuals may presumptively obtain the federal identification card if they 
can procure documentation from a doctor that fairly describes their genitalia. At 
the Department of Motor Vehicles, individuals can apply for the federal identi-
fication card by providing this doctor-issued documentation, as well as docu-
ments proving name, age, and Social Security number. While the application 
process for the federal identification card does require potential applicants to 
disclose and document details about their genitalia, the disclosure and docu-
mentation necessitated by this process differ fundamentally from the disclosure 
and documentation obtained through TSA pat-downs and strip-searches in that 
this application process allows individuals to choose the physicians to whom 
they disclose the details of their genitals, as well as the specific time of their 
disclosure. TSA screening procedures can be distressing for transgender pas-
 
113  See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
114  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
115  See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
116  See supra Part I. 
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sengers because they leave transgender passengers with few choices. They can-
not choose by whom they are patted down, nor can they choose when. 
 If Jamii Erway had enjoyed the benefits of the proposed identification card, 
she may never have had to endure the painful consequences of refusing to sub-
mit to a strip search by TSA officers. When the TSA officer screening Jamii 
Erway told her that she needed to submit to a strip-search, Jamii did not com-
ply; she and her mother left the airport together.117 However, Jamii’s decision 
was not without its ramifications. According to the legal complaint filed by Ja-
mii against TSA, “Jamii experienced severe emotional distress, including 
symptoms of panic, anxiety, fear, racing heart, shortness of breath, uncontrolla-
ble shaking, and nausea,” and, after she and her mother left the airport, they 
“drove over 600 miles to return home.”118 If Jamii had obtained and used the 
federal identification described in this Essay, there would have been no false 
alarm, no pat-down, and no threat of strip-search. She and her mother could 
have flown home instead of driving over 600 miles. Just as Jamii was not 
unique in her negative experience with TSA screening, she is not unique in the 
value that she might have derived from the federal identification card. Many of 
the issues that transgender passengers face at TSA checkpoints stem from false 
alarms. By using the identification card during the airport security process, a 
transgender passenger would not be issued a false alarm for any anomalous 
anatomy. Therefore, the passenger need not undergo either a pat-down or a 
more invasive search. Further, TSA officers need not worry that they are incor-
rectly designating passengers as either female or male; the identification card 
ensures that the full-body scanner will expect the genitalia that the owner of the 
card possesses.  
 By affording a substantial measure of anonymity to the transgender travel-
er, the proposed card system will not run the risk of abridging what the Essay 
has suggested is the right of privacy by a person to define her gender. To be 
sure, the process of obtaining the card may prove inconvenient to some travel-
ers, and perhaps even burdensome to others. Overall, however, the proposal of-
fered by the Essay should be accessible for most transgender people and should 
prove far less intrusive than present policies used by the TSA. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS? 
 Having proffered the proposal for an alternative identification system, this 
Essay will examine whether a failure by TSA might amount to a violation of 
the Constitution. This Essay suggests that there exists a fundamental right un-
der the substantive due process clause to define one’s gender. The TSA’s pre-
sent policy could be held a violation of that right. Justices have employed dif-
ferent tests to determine whether a law violates the substantive due process 
clause. In Lawrence, for example, a plurality of justices used what appeared to 
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be a heightened version of rational review to strike down Texas’s law.119 In Ca-
sey, a plurality of justices introduced the undue burden test to strike down por-
tions of Pennsylvania’s law regulating abortion.120 In Roe, the Court used strict 
scrutiny.121 Regardless of the chosen test, the Court has suggested that a law 
that abridges a fundamental right bears a heavy responsibility to justify its ex-
istence. The TSA’s concern for public safety is clearly valid, especially in light 
of 9/11. However, it is not clear whether the screening policy adopted by the 
TSA is equally justified given that the alternative policy limned by this Essay 
can in theory be implemented. Therefore, under substantive due process con-
siderations, the TSA’s present policy should probably be struck down. 
 A similar problem exists for the TSA when its present policy is subject to 
Fourth Amendment analysis. Under the Fourth Amendment, the government 
may not engage in unreasonable search and seizure.122 According to the Su-
preme Court, the amendment requires the government to show that there was a 
warrant for the search or that there existed individualized suspicion.123 The Su-
preme Court, however, has created an exception for searches deemed to be 
“administrative.”124 Administrative searches are those which take place “where 
the risk to public safety is substantial and real.”125 For administrative searches, 
“blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasona-
ble’—for example, searches now routine at airports and entrances to courts and 
other official buildings.”126 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals offered a useful 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s statement regarding administrative 
searches: 
We have held that airport screening searches, like the one at issue here, are con-
stitutionally reasonable administrative searches because they are “conducted as 
part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, 
namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and 
thereby to prevent hijackings.”127 
 
119  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582–83 (2003). 
120  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77, 901 (1992). 
121  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
122  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
123  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 623–24 (1989); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205–06 (1981). 
124  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308; see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 
(2000) (“Our holding also does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at plac-
es like airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public 
safety can be particularly acute.”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
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While the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant, the Ninth Circuit 
qualified that “the scope of such searches is not limitless.”128 The Ninth Circuit 
elaborated: “A particular airport security screening search is constitutionally 
reasonable provided that it ‘is no more extensive than necessary, in light of cur-
rent technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives [] [and] that it 
is confined in good faith to that purpose.’ ”129 
Jonathan Corbett, the attorney for Jamii Erway, asserted in the latter’s legal 
complaint that “the administrative search doctrine allows for only extremely 
limited, narrowly-tailored searches in furtherance of a regulatory scheme.”130 
While not identical to the language used by the Ninth Circuit, Corbett’s lan-
guage was quite similar. On the other hand, the First Circuit adopted a much 
more relaxed test: 
While we will not require the government to adopt the least intrusive practicable 
alternative, there must be a fairly close fit between the weight of the govern-
ment’s interest in searching and the intrusiveness of the search—that is, the 
search must be a “reasonably effective means” for furthering the important gov-
ernment interest.131 
Unlike Corbett and the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit has adopted a “bal-
ancing test:” “In a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search like that at issue 
here, we assess the search’s reasonableness by balancing ‘the public interest in 
the [TSA’s search] program against the privacy concerns implicated by the’ 
search.”132 Trying to resolve which approach is better—the balancing approach 
or one that is “no more extensive than necessary”—is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. 
 What this Essay can do is clarify the unique ways in which a TSA body 
search can prove especially invasive for transgender people, regardless of 
whether a given court decides to light upon the balancing approach or the “no 
more than necessary” approach. As explained in Part III, the policies adopted 
by TSA can have the effect of causing great emotional injury to transgender 
persons to such a degree that it may engender one of the following unwelcome 
outcomes. One, the TSA’s policy may cause those contemplating gender transi-
tion to quash their yearning to realize their true gender. Two, the TSA’s policy 
may cause those who have already undertaken some form of gender transition 
to forego its completion. Three, the TSA’s policy, by subjecting transgender 
people to regular forms of public humiliation, may cause them to consider self-
harm and suicide. Or, four, the TSA’s policy may cause transgender people to 
avoid traveling by airplane, an unrealistic alternative for many people. Any of 
these scenarios, standing alone, might suffice as an unjustifiable burden on 
what this Essay has suggested is a substantive right to determine one’s gender. 
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 The analysis under substantive due process would seem conceptually re-
moved from the aims of criminal procedure in the Fourth Amendment. Yet the 
conclusions regarding the former can inform analysis under the latter. The 
Fourth Amendment seeks to protect people from an unreasonable invasion of 
privacy by the government. Justice Brandeis in Olmstead had explained that the 
purpose of the right of privacy was to protect “the right to be let alone—the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”133 
The right of privacy as valued by transgender people is meant to protect their 
efforts to define themselves. Given the significance of the right at stake, the 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment must consider whether there exists alter-
native means available to the TSA to promote public safety at airports. As this 
Essay has limned, such a means exists in the proposed card identification sys-
tem. v 
V. THE ROLE OF RACE 
 The theme organizing the symposium in which this Essay appears centers 
on the relationship between criminal law and gender and race. This Essay has 
not dwelt on the relationship between race and transgender in the context of 
TSA searches because there is insufficient data to make any meaningful con-
clusions. Based on publicly available data, we do not know how many 
transgender people, according to their race, were subject to invasive searches 
by the TSA. Should such data materialize, the Supreme Court has furnished a 
means of analyzing it in terms of the principle of equal protection. The TSA’s 
policy does not, on its face, discriminate against people on the basis of race. 
Suppose, however, that new data shows the TSA’s policy as having dispropor-
tionately affected transgender people of a particular race. In that case, a dispar-
ate impact analysis can be applied.134 The Court can examine whether there is 
evidence that the TSA’s policy is applied in a racially-motivated manner or 
whether there are aspects of the policy that lend themselves to racial discrimi-
nation. If either can be proven, the TSA’s policy, as applied or on its face, will 
be subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection principle of the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause. At that point, the law will likely be struck 
down.135 Disparate impact analysis thus can have the effect of disaggregating 
race from gender or transgender. 
 The benefit of disparate impact analysis is also a defect, however. The ben-
efit is that disparate impact analysis can isolate ascriptive elements—race from 
transgender—and thus enable the Court to apply an analysis to one element. 
However, this benefit can also serve as the problem. Disparate impact analysis 
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fails to account for instances of intersectionality.136 Disparate impact analysis is 
meant to weed out instances where the law discriminates on the basis of race 
and where the law discriminates on the basis of transgender identity, but not 
where there is a convergence of both.137 That is, while disparate impact analysis 
can, in theory, isolate racial discrimination from transgender discrimination, the 
analysis is unable to identify instances where a person is discriminated by the 
TSA owing to her racial identity and her transgender identity. How to examine 
discrimination that affects such convergent identities is worthy of future schol-
arship. 
 
136  Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Femi-
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